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INCOME TAX EVASION BY LEASE OF CORPORATE PROPERTY
WHEN railroads and public utilities find it more profitable to acquire the
property of smaller competitors under long term leases than by outright
purchase, the leases frequently contain agreements by the lessee corporation,
in lieu of other rental, to make regular payments equivalent to dividends on
the lessor's stock directly to its stockholders. The earlier cases uniformly
concluded that payments so made constituted taxable income of the lessor
corporation, although it did not receive the rent and had no means of deduct-
ing the tax therefrom." In Rensselaer & Saratoga R.R. v. IMrin the court
reasoned that such a leasing agreement was "a mere labor saving device,
the effect being exactly the same as if it be paid to the lessor and by it paid
out as far as necessary to bondholders for interest, and the surplus in divi-
dends to its stockholders." 2 It is significant, however, that in arriving at
this result the courts were not concerned with the problem of how the tax
could be collected, since in all cases the lessor had paid it under protest and
then had sued for a refund.
3
The precise nature of the legal relations arising from these agreements Is
obscured by the construction placed upon them by New York Courts in
litigation involving the rights of stockholders of the lessor corporation. The
Federal courts in the taxation cases appear to have regarded the rent as
the property of the lessor, though paid out by its direction to its stockholders.
But in Bowers v. Interborough Rapid Transit 4 a stockholder was permitted
to recover the full 7% "dividend" specified in the leasing contract, in spite
of a subsequent 2% reduction agreed upon by the lessor and lessee corpora-
tions for purposes of refinancing. The court regarded the right of each
stockholder to his proportionate share of the rental as independent and
1 Rensselaer & S. R.R. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; West
End Street Ry. v. Malley, 246 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 1st, 1917); American Tel.
& Cable Co. v. United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 326 (1925). See Anderson v. Mor-
ris & Essex Co., 216 Fed. 83, 90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Blacklock v. Georgia
Ry. & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 387, 389 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); Hamilton v. lonf
tucky Terminal Co., 289 Fed. 20, 24 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923); HOLDIES, FEDRAL
TAXES (6th ed. 1925) § 135. The decisions seem to be in harmony with
other attempts by the courts to circumvent the corporate device when it
results in avoidance of tax liability. See Magill, Allocation'of Incomo by
Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 935.
2 Supra note 1, at 728.
3 It has been held that no obligation to pay the lessor's income tax rests
on the lessee. Brainard v. New York Central, 242 N. Y. 125, 151 N. E.
152 (1926) ; Sharon Railroad Co. v. Erie Railroad Co., 268 Pa. 396, 112 Atl.
242 (1920).
4121 lisc. 250, 201 N. Y. Supp. 198 (Sup. Ct. 1923), a/I'd 208 App. DIv.
768, 202 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1st Dep't 1924). See also Peabody v. Interborough
R. T. Co., 124 Misc. 801, 804, 209 N. Y. Supp. 376, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
But see Peabody v. Interborough R. T. Co., 121 Misc 647, 656, 202 N. Y.
Supp. 287, 294 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
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beyond the power of the lessor corporation to interfere therewith.C Such a
ruling, the implications of which seem to be that the rent is payable to the
stockholders without regard to the status of the lessor's earningsG is difficult
to reconcile with the analogy of dividends. Moreover it would be strain-
ing a concept to regard the rent as the property of the corporation if the
stockholder must receive his proportionate share at all events.
The perplexities of the problem confronted a Federal court again in the
recent case of United States v. The Western Union Telegraph Co 7 A 99
year lease of property to the Western Union Co. provided for rental in the
form of semi-annual payments on the lessor's stock directly to its stock-
holders. The government, contending that the payments constituted the
lessor's taxable income, asserted a lien for unpaid taxes upon such funds in
the possession of the Western Union. Thereupon a suit in equity was
brought to restrain the Western Union from making payments to the stock-
holders, praying that the full amount be surrendered to the government in
satisfaction of the tax indebtedness. The action was defeated. Expressing
doubt as to the soundness of the earlier Federal decisions in the light of the
New York cases, the court in effect rendered impotent the rule that such
payments constitute taxable income by holding that in any event the tax
could not be collected by the claim of a lien therefor.S It was further stated
that in the absence of statutory provision there was no general jurisdiction
for the government to proceed in equity. The government is thus forced to
rely on the remedy of distraint and sale.9 Ordinarily, however, as appears
to be the fact in the Western Union case, the only property left to the lessor
corporation against which the government can proceed is the reversionMO
which, when separated from the rent, under a long term lease, is of decidedly
questionable value.
If the courts bestow their sanction upon such a device to deprive the gov-
ernment of the regular corporation income tax, it will not only be widely
sought after by smaller companies as a mode of surrendering to their larger
competitors, but it will also present a dangerous opportunity for evasion
through the use of "dummy" corporations." It is of little effect to argue
Stockholders were allowed to sue the lessee in their own names in Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Albany & S. R. Co., 156 Fed. 132 (C. C. S. ). N. Y. 1907),
and McLeary v. Erie Telegraph & T. Co., 38 Misc. 3, 76 N. Y. Supp. 712
(Sup. Ct. 1902). Cf. Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257, 22 N. E. 756
(1889). Where the lease provides for payments to be made to the lessor
corporation, however, the stockholders are held to have no cause of action.
Flagg v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 10 Fed. 413 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1881); People
v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., 26 Hun. 82 (N. Y. 1881).
C It seems scarcely believable that these implications would be followed
if creditors of the lessor were complaining.
7 50 F. (2d) 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
s The Federal statute permitting tax liens upon the property of delin-
quents provides that "... such lien shall not be valid as against any mort-
gagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed
by the collector.. ." 45 STAT. 875 (1928), 26 U. S .C. § 115 (1926). The
court reasoned that since, by the quoted provision of the statute no pro-
tection against a possible double liability was afforded to a contract debtor
such as the Western Union Co., the lien could not apply to a debt.
914 STAT. 107 (1866), 43 STAT. 343 (1924), 26 U. S. C. § 116 (1926).
10 See cases cited supra note 1. In some instances the lessee pays a small
sum yearly to the lessor to enable it to maintain its corporate existence.
American Tel. & Cable Co. v. U. S., supra note 1.
" A possible arrangement would consist of a lease of the property of one
corporation to another corporation organized for the purpose at a rental
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that in these cases the lessee could be taxed on its income from the leased
property since rentals are deducted as a business expense in computing n~t
income.2 And in taxing the income to the stockholders the government
would lose the difference between the normal tax rate for a corporation and
that for individuals.1 3 The Rensselaer case, it is believed, may still be fol-
lowed in order to avoid the conclusion that real income disappears through
ingenious channels of payment-leaving neither income nor tax. Further-
more, in view of the recognized status of stockholders as ultimate benefici-
aries of a corporation's earnings, the unusual protection given such stock-
holders by the New York courts should not affect the consideration that for
purposes of tax collection the rental payments should be considered tile
property of the lessor corporation 14 against which a lien could be filed for
its unpaid taxes.'0 It has been held that the government has all the remedies
which are afforded a private creditor unless specifically barred from them,1J
Thus, without express statutory sanction, the government should be able to
proceed in equity to enforce its lien, and as a creditor of the lessor corpora-
tion compel the lessee to surrender the rent.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REFERENDUM
IN 1929 the Illinois General Assembly enacted a statute providing for the
service of women as jurors which was "not to be in force unless the ques-
tion of its adoption has been submitted to the legal voters of the state and
approved by a majority of all the votes cast upon the proposition."1 The
measure, approved in the specified method, was subsequently challenged as
an attempt on the part of the Legislature to delegate its legislative powers
to the people. In Zito v. United Stafes,2 however, the Federal District
Court sustained its validity, going so far as to predict that, although tho
Illinois Supreme Court had not passed on the precise question, on the basis
of past decisions it would doubtless uphold the act. But one month later,
apparently unaware of the federal decision, the Illinois Supreme Court had
occasion to pass on the identical statute, and, with one justice dissenting,
held it unconstitutional as an improper "delegation of legislative power." 3
Where state Constitutions contain provisions, either requiring a referen-
dum to make effective certain types of legislation 4 or permitting its exercise
that would preclude profit to the latter. The only taxable income would
be the payment to the stockholders of the dummy lessor.
1244 STAT. 41 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 986 (1926).
I3 See SEN. RES. Dec. 16, 1929 c. 2 § 1; 46 STAT. 47 (1929) ; 26 U. S. C.
§ 2011 (Supp. 1928) (in effect Jan. 1, 1929). Obviously the wider the
distribution of income the more do exemptions eat into the original taxable
amount.
14 If such a conclusion should prove embarrassing by reason of a possible
double liability of the lessee corporation, it will merely be a deterrent to
future arrangements of this character.
25 By judicial construction the lien statute (supra note 8) could be en-
larged to include a contract debtor. If the courts refuse to so interpret
the provision, statutory action will be necessary to accomplish the result.
16 Blacklock v. United States, 208 U. S. 75, 28 Sup. Ct. 228 (1908).
1 ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 78, § 25.
2 Fed. Cas., No. 1718 (S. D. Ill. 1931) (Not yet reported.)
3 People v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. 108 (1931).
4Cf. ILL. CoNsT. 1870, art. XI § 5 (referendum necessary before act creat-
ing corporation with banking powers can go into effect) ; N. Y. CONST. 1894,
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at the voters' election, the only objection to its validity would seem to be
that it violates the federal guarantee to the states of a "republican form of
government." 6 The question remains for Congress to determine 7 and has
not been passed on. But in the light of etymology, history, and certain
writings pertinent to and contemporary with the framing of the Constitu-
tion,s the phrase "republican form of government" may be regarded as
sufficiently elastic to admit of occasional instances of "direct" as opposed
to "representative" government.0 In the absence of constitutional provi-
sions, however, the courts have generally held invalid the attempts of legis-
latures to enact statutes the execution of which is made contingent upon
state-wide popular approval.' 0 A referendum of this nature is questionable
not only on the federal ground but also on the issue of its inconsistency with
the more definite principles of representative government implicit in most
state constitutions." The courts frequently adopt the arguments that the
art. VII, § 4 (referendum required before legislature can contract debts
other than those specified) ; W. VA. CoNsT. 1872, art. VI, § 50 (referendum
prerequisite to act changing proportional representation in state senate).
For the revision and amendment of constitutions themselves, most states
provide either for constitutional conventions, in which case the amendments
proposed by the convention to be effective must receive the favorable vote of
the qualified electors; or for legislative proposals upon which the people vote
directly; or occasionally for both methods. Cf. DODD, REVISION AND A=ND-
MENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1910) 134-136.
5S. D. CONST. 1889, art. III, § 1; MD. CONST. 1867, art. XVI, §§ 1-6. The
"Initiative and Referendum" Amendment has been adopted in one form or
another in 21 states. See DODD, STATE GOVTRNMNT (2d ed. 1928) 526, 527.
For its use in a typical year, see KING, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ELEC-
TIONS OF 1926 (1927).
G U. S: CONST., Art. IV, § 4. Compare Rice v. Foster, 4 Harr. 479 (Del.
1847) and Parker v. Commonwealth, 6 Barr. 507 (Pa. 1847) with Kadderly
v. Portland, 44 Ore. 118, 74 Pac. '710 (1903); Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo.
408, 130 S. W. 689 (1910); and Ex parte Wagner, 21 Old. 33, 95 Pac. 435
(1908).
7 Ohio v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565, 36 S. Ct. 708 (1916); Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118, 32 S. Ct. 224 (1912). But see Kier-
nan v. Portland, 57 Ore. 454, 471, 112 Pac. 402, 404 (1910).
8 See Note (1910) 24 HAnv. L. REV. 141, 142; BEAnD & SCHULTZ, STATE-
WIDE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL (1912) 23-32.
9 Cf. (1923) 21 OHIO L. BULL. 103; 21 ibid. 121; Ohio v. Hildebrant, smpra.
note 7. But of. (1923) 21 OHIo L. BuLL. 71; O'NEAL, REPRESENTT E Gov1
ERNMENT AND THE COMMON LAW (1912), 4 et passhz. That the referendum
is consonant with the genius of a republican government, see Caldwell v.
Barrett, 73 Ga. 604, 606 (1884) ; Police Jury v. McDonogh, 8 La. Ann. 341,
359 (1853). But cf. Rice v. Foster and Parker v. Commonwealth, both
supra note 6.
' Barto v. Himrod, 8 N. Y. 483 (1853) ; Brawner v. Supervisors of Elec-
tions, 141 Md. 586, 119 Atl. 250 (1922) ; WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION,%L LiW
OF THE UNITED STATES, (2nd. ed. 1930) § 745; cf. Dodd, E:xtraconstitz tional
Limitations Upon Legislative Power (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 1188, 1200-
1203. But cf. State v. Frear, 142 Wis. 322, 125 N. W. 961 (1910) ; Hudspeth
v. Swayze, 85 N. J. L. 592, 89 Atl. 780 (1914); Cottrell v. Lenoir, 173 N. C.
138, 91 S. E. 827 (1917).
11 The typical provisions quoted as embodying the representative principle
are: "To secure these [inherent and inalienable] rights . . . govern-
ments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the con-
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General Assembly, having been vested with the legislative power by the
people through their constitution, can be divested thereof, if at all, only by
a change in that constitution; 1 that, although the execution of an act may
be made dependent upon a contingency which affects the "wisdom or ex-
pediency" of the measure, the vote of the people "abstractly considered" is
not such a contingency; 13 and that legislatures, if allowed to "delegate"
their "duty" to legislate, will become timid and irresponsible cabals, leaving
the people to the "tyranny" of "vindictive, arbitrary, and excited major-
ities." 14
On the other hand, courts have not failed to distinguish from general
statutes contingent upon a state-wide vote those statutes which are operative
only in a particular locality and dependent for their effectiveness upon the
popular vote of the locality.' 5 Optional referenda of this type have been
upheld as compatible with the powers of self-government always enjoyed by
municipal organizations.'G Furthermore, the courts have consistently sus-
tained "local option" statutes which, though state-wide in application, are
thought to depend so much on peculiar local conditions as to justify the
legislature in leaving the question of their adoption or rejection within each
community to the community itself. T The distinction between local and
state-wide referenda, based largely on specious reasoning is and resulting
sent of the governed"; "The legislative authority of this state shall be
vested in a general assembly .... " See ILL. CONST. 1870, art. II § 1; art. IV,
§ 1; of. NEB. CONST. 1875, art. 1, § 1; art. III, § 1. But see Dodd, op. cit.
supra note 10 at 1202.
12 State v. Hayes, 61 N. H. 264, 329 (1881) ; Parker v. Commonwealth,'
supra note 6 at 514. But of. Holmes, J., dissenting in Re Municipal Suffrage,
160 Mass. 586, 593, 594, 36 N. E. 488, 491 (1894) ; C. W. & Z. R. R. Co. v.
Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 87, 88 (1852).
3 Barto v. Himrod, supra note 10 at 490; Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279,
290, 291 (1874). But of. Commonwealth v. Weller, 14 Bush. 218, 222 (Ky.
1878); Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652, 663 (1859). Cf. State v. Parker,
26 Vt. 357, 365 (1853) (referendum to determine time act to go into effect);
People v. Collins, 3 Mich. 343 (1859) (semble).
14Rice v. Foster, supra note 6, at 496; Willard, J., in Barto v. Himrod,
supra note 10, at 496. But cf. People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 1, 13 (Ill. 1848);
DODD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 552.
15 Nabb v. Andren, 89 Fla. 414, 104 So. 591 (1925) ; Attorney General v.
Springwells, 143 Mich. 523, 107 N. W. 87 (1906); Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn.
306, 283 S. W. 751 (1926) ; see Note (1929) 64 A .L. R. 1366. But cf. Arthur
v. State, 148 Tenn. 434, 256 S. W. 437 (1923) ; Levering v. Board of Super-
visors, 137 Md. 281, 112 Atl. 301 (1920).
16 See Wright v. Cunningham, 115 Tenn. 445, 466, 91 S. W. 293, 297, 298
(1905) ; Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 375-378, 105
S. E. 141, 149, 150 (1920); 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. (8th
ed. 1927) 235, 236.
17 Olds v. State, 133 So. 641 (Fla. 1931) ; Cleveland v. City of Watertown,
222 N. Y. 159, 118 N. E. 500 (1917); Re School Code of 1919, 7 Boyce 400,
108 At. 31 (Del. 1919). But cf. Lyle v. State, 80 Tex. Cr. App. 606, 193
S. W. 680 (1917); Rowe v. Ray, 120 Neb. 118, 231 N. W. 689 (1930);
Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1062. Cf. OBERHOLTZE., THE REFERENDUMi IN
AMERICA (1893) 80, 81.
18 " . . the true distinction . . . is this: the legislature cannot delegate
its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or in-
tends to make, its own action depend." Locke's Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 498
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doubtless in an unsatisfactory situation,19 seems to have arisen chiefly
through attempts by various courts to modify their earlier stand against
the referendum.2-0 A tendency to circumvent the distinction and permit the
use of the referendum as a constitutional method of legislation is manifested
by the increasing number of "initiative and referendum" amendments,c' and
by the number of jurisdictions that have in one way or another upheld
statutes providing for the expression of popular opinion.22 The final step
in abolishing the distinction appears to have been taken by the Federal
court in the Zito case.
RIGHTS OF INNOCENT PURCHASER OF MUNICIPAL BONDS ISSUED FOR
ILLMnITIMATE PURPOSES
THE recent Ohio ease of State v. Board of Conzmissiom-rs of Alhnz Coznty 2
illustrates the difficulties confronting the courts in suits involving the valid-
ity of municipal bonds where the conflicting equities of innocent purchasers
and tax-payers are nicely balanced. The bonds in that case had been issued
by a county to finance the construction of a sewer in a district, which,
though it had no need of sewerage facilities, had been selected by the com-
missioners because of their own private interests. Executed and sold in
full compliance with statutory requirements, the bonds passed into the hands
of an innocent purchaser. Upon default in the payment of several install-
ments of interest and principal, suit was brought to compel the levy and
collection of special assessments and general taxes sufficient to retire the
bonds. In granting the plaintiff's petition and compelling the tax-payers
to satisfy a debt contracted without their knowledge and unproductive of
any benefits to the community the court considered conclusive the fact that
the county officials had full power, conferred by valid legislative action, to
issue bonds in payment for improvements.
The decision was manifestly influenced by the established rule that a pur-
chaser of municipal bonds is bound to know only the constitutional and
statutory provisions bearing on the question of authority to issue them.2
From this it follows that, with respect to matters of fact, he is in general
(1873). "The true distinction is between a delegation of power to make
the law, which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, and con-
ferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law." SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2nd
ed. 1904) 148. Cf. People v. Reynolds, supra note 14, at 13.
-9 See CooL-y, op. cit. supra note 10, at 238, 239; cf. State v. Frear, 142
Wis. 320, 332, 125 N. W. 961, 966 (1910).
20 Cf. Eckerson v. Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 115 N. W. 177 (1903);
People v. Kennedy, 207 N. Y. 533, 545, 101 N. E. 442, 446 (1913).
21 See DODD, loc. cit. supra note 5.
22 Cf. Greenwood v. Rickman, 145 Tenn. 361, 235 S. W. 925 (1921); Des
Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 193 Iowa 1096, 184 N. W. 823 (1921) ; State v.
St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 904-907, 2 S. W. (2d) 713, 725, 72G (1928).
'177 N. E. 271 (Ohio 1931).
2 See Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674, 6;0, 9 Sup. Ct. 054, 055 (18S9);
State v. Board of Education, 27 Ohio St. 96, 97 (1S75). As regards defects
in form of execution, however, a purchaser is also charged with notice of
state laws and the relevant provisions of the municipal charter. McClure
v. Township of Oxford, 94 U. S. 429 (1876); D'Esterre v. City of Brooklyn,
90 Fed. 586 (E. D. N. Y. 1898); White River Savings Bank v. City of
Superior, 148 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906).
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not required to go beyond the recitals appearing in the public records a and
on the bonds themselves.4 Although the application of this doctrine of
"estoppel by recital" has been largely confined to cases involving the valid-
ity of municipal securities contested because of some failure to comply with
statutory formalities in their execution,r nevertheless the instant decision is
not without precedent in employing the theory to protect the holder of val-
idly executed bonds regardless of the purposes for w;,hich they were is-
sued.6 Indeed only when the holder of invalid municipal bonds sues on a
quasi-contractual basis is the purpose to which the proceeds of the bonds are
appropriated given any significance. Accordingly a public corporation may
be held liable on an implied contract for money received for invalid securl-
ties only if the funds shall have remained unexpendedI or shall actually have
been appropriated to some legitimate purposes Where, however, money re-
ceived for invalid securities is expended for an improper purpose, even a
holder in due course cannot recover on the implied contractY This criterion
of liability, namely, the ultimate use to which the proceeds are appropriated,
was clearly rejected in the instant case. It is conceivable, in view of the
grossly fraudulent nature of the bond issue and of the total lack of benefits
to the taxpayer accruing therefrom, that the court might have intervened
for his protection.'O On the other hand a contrary ruling would tend to
immunize the tax-payer from liability for the dishonesty of his local officials,
and to intensify the lethargic attitude characteristically exhibited toward
3 Penton v. Brown-Crummer Investment Co., 222 Ala. 155, 131 So. 14
(1930).
4Lake County v. Graham, supra note 2; Board of Education v. James, 49
F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Note (1929) 15 VA. L. REv. 263. But
where recitals on municipal bonds are made by one unauthorized to do so,
the municipality is not estopped from denying their validity. City of San-
ford v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 50 F. (2d) 400 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931).
5 See 1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 324; and cases
cited supra notes 2, 3, and 4.
6 Presidio County of Texas v. Noel-Young Bond & Stock Co., 212 U. S.
58, 29 Sup. Ct. 237 (1908); City of Huron v. Second Ward Savings Bank,
86 Fed. 272 (C. C. A. 8th, 1898).
7 Valley Falls Co. v. Taft, 27 R. 1. 136, 61 Atl. 41 (1905). It has been
held that in order that a holder of invalid municipal securities be entitled
to recover on the implied contract, the money paid must be accurately traced
into a specific fund. Litchfield v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190, 5 Sup. Ct. 820
(1885); of. Brown v. City of Newburyport, 209 Mass. 259, 95 N. E. 504
(1911).
$ Dodge v. City of Memphis, 51 Fed. 165 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1892); Board
of Commissioners of Bayou Terre aux Boeufs Drainage District v. Mac-
Clellan, 164 La. 808, 114 So. 694 (1927); State v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102
So. 739 (1924).
9 Watson v. City of Huron, 97 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899). One who
has received void bonds in return for services rendered or materials fur.
nished can in no case recover on the quantum menrit for the reason that, no
money having been received ,for the securities, they could only be satisfied
by adding to the burdens of he tax-payer. City of Parkersburg v. Brown
106 U. S. 487, 1 Sup. Ct. 442 (1883) ; Cohen v. City of Henderson, 182 Iy.
658, 207 S. W. 4 (1918).
10 Cf. City of Chicago v. Municipal Engineering & Contracting Co., 292
Ill. 614, 127 N. E. 65 (1920); Hightower v. City of Raleigh, 150 N. C. 569,
571, 65 S. E. 279, 281 (1909); (1929) 27 MICr. L. REv. 588.
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municipal government. Furthermore to render the bondholder's investment
worthless would have a disastrous effect upon the corporate credit.1
It is apparent that the adequate protection of the rights of both bond-
holder and tax-payer can only be obtained through legislation which pre-
cludes the possibility of such litigation. Steps in this direction have been
taken in many states. Ohio minimizes the possibilities of suit because of
failure to comply with statutory formalities by requiring the successful bid-
der for municipal bonds to be furnished with a transcript of all proceedings
relating to their issuance.0 2 In New Jersey a state commissioner of municipal
accounts must certify that improvements are proper and necessary before
any ordinance authorizing such improvement or any indebtedness therefor
can be passed.& 3 New York and New Jersey require publication of ordi-
nances authorizing bond issues before such securities are sold; if the issue
is not attacked within a certain time, the validity of the bonds may not
thereafter be questioned. All such statutes undoubtedly leave room for
litigation concerning defects in authority. To obviate this final difficulty
a few western and southern states require the issuing authorities to seek
a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of a security issue'S Inter-
ested parties are given an opportunity to be heard, but after final judgment,
or the expiration of the time allotted for appeal, no further attack on the
issue is permitted. This procedure seems the most satisfactory method of
removing the uncertainty inherent in the judicial determination of municipal
bond questions.16
INTERSTATE RIPARIAN RIGHTS UNDER THE BOULDR CANYON PROJECT Acr
THE alleged ground of complaint in Arizona's unsuccessful attack' upon
the Boulder Canyon Project Act 2 was that her sovereignty had been invaded
by the refusal of the Secretary of Interior, under authority of the act, to
conform to state police regulations and to submit plans of the dam to the
state engineer for his approval according to Arizona law. The real ques-
tion at issue was whether a single recalcitrant state could prevent the Fed-
eral government and six other states from developing a project for irriga-
tion and waterpower on an interstate river. Nothing in the Constitution
could have been intended by the framers as a denial or affirmation of the
"I See 2 DILLoN, MuNICIPAL CoRPoRATioNs (5th ed. 1911) § 827; Horack,
The City's Liability on Street Improvement Bonds in Iowa (1928) 17 NAT.
MuN. REv. 236, 237.
- OHIO GEN. CODn (Page, 1926) tit. VIII, c. I § 2295 (3).
13 N. J. CoMp. STAT. (Ann. Supp. 1931) "136 § 4600 I (11) c, § 4600 I
(11) d, § 4600 I (11) e. The determination of the commissioner is made
conclusive. Ibid. § 4600 I (11) d.
14 N. J. CoMnp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925), *136 § 4600 I (9) ; N. Y. CO.-S.
LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 22, § 111, § 112. See Sullivan v. Borough of Ramsay,
105 N. J. Law 142, 143 At. 364 (1928).
15ARIz. REV. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928), c. 81, art. 4, § 3511-512;
CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1123) art. 9125, § 15; FL... Gox. LmWs (Skill-
man, 1927) Vol. 2, §§ 5106-5129; N. Al. ANN. STAT. (1929) c. 73 art. 249-
253. See Board of Education v. James, szpra note 4, at 96-98. A typical
judgment of validity is presented in the margin on page 93.
-16 See Note (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 829.
lArizona v. California, 51 Sup. Ct. 522 (U. S. 1931).
2 45 STAT. 1057 (1928), 43 U. S. C. §§ 617-617 (t) (1926).
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government's power to construct such works.8 Yet the court, to further mod-
ern demands for irrigation and water-power ingeniously invoked the federal
government's power over navigation. 4 It might as easily have relied on
the power of the federal government to provide for the beneficial use of
public lands; 5 or on the necessity of fulfilling treaty obligations on an in-
ternational stream; 6 or on the power to regulate interstate commerce,' since
the waterpower was to be trans mitted across state lines; or possibly on the
power to prevent floods from washing out trans-continental railroad lines,
delaying postal service and disrupting interstate motor traffic.8 Having dis-
posed of the constitutional problem, the court refused to pass on the further
question of interstate riparian rights in the absence of any indication that
the acts of the defendants under authority of the statute would impair Ari-
zona's right to appropriate and beneficially use the unappropriated waters
of the Colorado.0 The rule was repeated that in cases involving conflicts
between the states the extraordinary powers of the court will not be re-
sorted to without proof of a serious invasion of rights far beyond the degree
customarily required in civil suits.o
The different approach required in a dispute over riparian rights be-
a See Niles, The Swing-Johnson Bill and the Supreme Court (1930) 3
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1.
4 U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. 1, § 8, c. 3. Whether the Colorado River is
navigable in fact is a question of much dispute. It has even been suggested
that the dam will tend to cut down whatever navigability now exists. This,
however, does not consider the fact that an artificial lake about 75 miles
long will be impounded above the dam and could be used for interstate
traffic. See OLSON, THE COLORA"o RIVER COMPACT (1926) 101-104.
5 U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 3; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S.
151, 6 Sup. Ct. 670 (1886); U. S. v. Sandaval, 231 U. S. 28, 34 Sup. Ct. 1
(1913). See also U. S. v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U. S,
690, 703, 19 Sup. Ct. 770, 775 (1898). For the extent of public land still
unappropriated in the seven states concerned in the Colorado River Compact
see OLSON, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 139, n. 130; Vacant Public Lands on
July 1, 1929, Department of Interior, General Land Office, Circular 1197,
at 3-10.
6 The Colorado River has been the subject of treaty arrangements between
the United States and Mexico on at least two instances. See Treaty of
Guadeloupe-Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, art. VI, VII, in 1 MALLOY, U. S. TREATIES
(1910) 1107, 1111; Gadsden Treaty, Dec. 30, 1853, art. IV, ibid. 1121, 1123.
7U. S. CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 3. See also in this regard the Federal
Water Power Act, 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 791 (1926) ; Frank-
furter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study In
Interdtate Adjustments (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 685, 718.
8 See Niles, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12; HEARINGS ON ii. R. RErORT 5773
before H. R. Comm. on Reclamation and Irrigation, 70th Congress 1st Soes.,
at 246, Jan. 11 and 12, 1928.
6 Under the terms of The Colorado River Compact, of the 7,500,000 acre
feet allotted to the lower basin, 4,400,000 have been apportioned to Cali-
fornia, and 100,000 to Nevada. If and when Arizona withdraws more than
the remaining 3,000,000 acre-feet, the conflicting rights will have to be
determined.
-0 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 496, 26 Sup. Ct. 268 (1906); New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U. S. 296, 41 Sup. Ct. 492 (1921); North Dakota v. Min-
nesota, 263 U. S. 365, 44 Sup. Ct. 138 (1923) ; Connecticut v. Massachusetts,
51 Sup. Ct. 286 (U. S. 1931). See RoGsS, Some Problems of Interstate
Water War (1923) 26 COLORADO BAR ASS'N REP. 107, 116.
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tween quasi-sovereign states"1 has resulted in the development of a body
of rules related more to equitable and economic than to legal principles.m
The Supreme Court has insisted on being free to apply state, federal or in-
ternational law as the equities of the ease might require.13 Consequently
in a suit by Kansas, a common-law riparian state, against Colorado, a "prior
appropriation state," for interference with vested water rights, the doctrine
of equitable apportionment was applied because the benefits to Colorado
from the diversion of water were of more consequence than the detriment
to Kansas.'4 In Wyoming v. Colorado,'5 the court appeared to revert to
the prior-appropriation doctrine, basing its decision on the fact that both
states recognized that rule in intra-state disputes. But in the two recent
cases of Connecticut v. Massachusetts 10 and New Jersey v. New York,'
though all four states enforced riparian rights as at common-law, the court,
observing the disproportion between the damage to one state and the benefits
to the other, applied the sounder rule of equitable apportionment5 s If, there-
fore, the question of conflicting riparian rights on the Colorado does mate-
rialize, considerations of economy and social interest should again influence
the court to permit a distribution among those potentially able to make the
greatest economic use of the water, rather than to those whose sole claim
is priority of use. To apply the prior appropriation doctrine 20 would be to
impose a servitude on the people of one state for the benefit of the other,
a result thoroughly inconsistent with the theory of equality between sover-
eign states.20 Furthermore, the prior appropriation doctrine, a product of
the frontier community, has outlived its social utility 2 and is not in con-
sonance with the trend toward conservation and a practical distribution of
natural resources -when cumulative demands threaten to exhaust them.
". See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra note 10, at 289; New Jersey
v. New York, 51 Sup. Ct. 478, 479 (1931).
3.2 Cf. Missouri v. Illinois, supra note 10, at 520, 26 Sup. Ct. at 2G9;
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237, 27 Sup. Ct. 618, G19
(1907).
'3 See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, supra, note 10, at 289.
'14Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (1907).
15 259 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552 (1922). Whether the court actually ap-
plied the prior appropriation doctrine has been a subject of dispute among
authorities on riparian rights. See OLSON, op. cit. supra note 4, at '75-97;
Rogers, op. cit. supra note 10; Niles, Legal Background of the Colorado River
Controversy (1929) 1 RoCKY IT. L. Rsv. 73, 87; Bannister, Interstate
Rights in Interstate Streams in the Arid West (1923) 36 HAnV. L. REV. 960;
Lasky, From Prior Appropriation to Economic Distribution of Water by
the State Via Irrigation Administration (1929) 2 RocKY MT. L. REV. 35, 54.
11 Supra note 10.
IT 51 Sup. Ct. 478 (U. S. 1931).
:S The court attempted to distinguish the Wyoming v. Colorado decision
by saying that the application of the prior appropriation rule to the par-
ticular state of facts was in accord with equitable doctrines and principles.
'19 With the exception of California all the states in the Colorado River
basin recognize the prior appropriation rule, slightly modified by statutes.
20 Carpenter, Application of the Reserve T-'eaty Powers of the States to
Interstate Water Controversies (1921) 24 COLOR. nO B.R Ass'N, REr. 45, 76;
Carman, Sovereign Rights and Relations in The Control and Use of Anzcr-
ican Waters (1929) 3 So. CAL. L. REV. 266, 299.
2 'Niles, op. cit. supra note 15, at 96; Lasky, op. cit. supra note 15, at 57.
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TRANSFER TAX ON CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF LAND
A RESIDENT of Pennsylvania died while under contract to sell realty owned
in Missouri and New Jersey. The state attempted to impose a transfer tax
on the appraised value of the contract 1 but the tax was hold invalid on
the ground that the state had no jurisdiction.2 Upon similar facts, a Now
York court 3 has reached the same result, whereas a contrary rule obtains in
Minnesota. 4 However, New York courts, in the converse situation, where
the decedent was a nonresident, and the realty was within the state, have
held that no tax could be imposed because the decedent's interest was "Inl
tangible personality," taxable only at his domicile.5 Such diversity among
the few decisions on the point arises from a lack of clarity and uniformity
in the tests to be applied in determining the state's power to tax.
The Supreme Court, although indicating since Frrick v. Pennsylvaniao
a policy definitely opposed to double taxation, has effected its purpose not
by express prohibition but rather by various tests of tangibility and situs
and by the liberal invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam was formerly used to reach the extraterritorial
personalty of a resident decedent. 7 By the decision in the Fick case, how-
ever, its application was restricted to intangibles, with the resulting neces-
sity of determining the precise content of that illusory concept.S Another
complication was introduced when the Court, in its stand against double
taxation, utilized the concept of a "taxable" or "business" situs. Thus there
are at present at least three standards applied in inheritance tax cases in-
volving different states: whether the property is tangible or intangible;
where the situs lies; and whether the property is of such a nature as can
acquire a secondary "taxable" situs. Which test should control, or whether
all three should be given weight, has not been clearly answered. Moreover,
1 Under Act of June 20, 1919, Pa. Laws 521.
2 In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Atl. 503 (1931).
3 Matter of Wolcott, 94 Misc. 73, 157 N. Y. Supp. 268 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
4 State v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493 (1920).
5 Matter of Boshart, 188 App. Div. 788, 177 N. Y. Supp. 574 (4th Dept.,
1919) ; Matter of Russell, 119 Misc. 12, 194 N. Y. Supp. 837 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
Accord: Dodge County v. Burns, 89 Neb. 534, 131 N. W. 922 (1911).
6268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1924).
7 However, when an application of the maxim would prevent the state from
taxing, it was disregarded as a "mere fiction." Succession of Popp, 146 La.
464, 83 So. 765 (1920) ; State of'Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71, 133 N. E.
357 (1921).
8 See Otis, What is Tangible Property? (1927) 1 CONN. BAR J. 146; (1925)
35 YALE L. J. 357. In Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410
(1927), a partnership interest, stocks, and U. S. bonds, were held intangible,
while cash was held tangible.
9 Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929)
(bonds deposited in trust in Maryland, taxed by Maryland, held not taxable
in Virginia, domicile of beneficiaries) noted in (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 589. But
cf. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929) (promissory
notes owned by Illinois decedent, deposited in Missouri, secured by Missouri
realty, taxed by Illinois, held not taxable in Missouri) noted in (1930) 44
HARv. L. REv. 132. An interest in a trust has been held to have the same
situs as the trust. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 197 Mass. 248, 83 N. E. 881 (1908) ;
Peabody v. Treasurer, 215 Mass. 129, 102 N. E. 435 (1913) ; In ro Thorne's
Estate, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638 (1920). "Accounts receivable" have
been given a business situs apart from the domicile of the owner Miami Coal
Co. v. Fox, 176 N. E. 11 (Ind. 1931).
[Vol. 41
little certainty is attained by frequent use of the Fourteenth Amendment,30
for the due process requirement is not in itself a test but rather an obvious
conclusion after a test has been applied.
The principal case illustrates the effect of such uncertainty. The court
rests its decision on the ground that since no tax could be imposed on the
transfer of the land, none can be imposed on the contract, which "stands
for" the land. It says further that "the law of equitable conversion cannot
be invoked merely to subject property to taxation, especially when the ques-
tion is one of jurisdiction between different states." 2 The basis for the ar-
gument is apparently that since the contract "stands for" the land, some
sort of conversion into personalty must be effected before the state has juris-
diction to tax. This is a confusion of the decedent's legal relations in respect
to the land with those in respect to the contract. As pointed out by an able
dissent, the question is merely whether the state has the right to tax the
simple contract right, the solvent credit of a resident decedent, and the doc-
trine of equitable conversion has no application whatever. Nor does the
problem of double taxation arise. Even were the decedents interest in the
land taxed, the taxing of the contract right would involve a totally different
interest. For the decedent's interest in the land itself is valueless in view of
his obligation to convey the title, and while the legal title passes to his heirs
for the purpose of such a conveyance, the executors acquire the right to the
purchase price, enforceable in Pennsylvania courts. Moreover, neither Mis-
souri nor New Jersey, where the decedent's realty was situated, could tax
the transfer because of the rule which they have adopted that a vendor's
interest in land which he has contracted to sell is thereby converted into per-
sonalty, and is taxable only at the domicile.'2 The same rule applies in other
jurisdictions.j3 Thus the decision results in an anomalous situation where
neither the states where the realty is located nor the state of the domicile
can tax the transfer of the decedent's interest. There seems little reason
for a state to limit its own taxing power when there is no possibility of
double taxation, and there is even less when to do so permits valuable prop-
erty to go entirely tax free.
RIGHT OF SURETY TO PARTICIPATE As GENERAL CREDITOR IN AssErss OF
INSOLVENT BANK
UNDER the familiar "chancery rule!? a depositor in an insolvent bank is
authorized to prove his claim in full, without regard to the existence of col-
'' The generality with which the Fourteenth Amendment is dealt is ap-
parent in the court's dictum in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,
280 U. S. 204, 210, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 99 (1929): "In this Court, the presently
approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within its juris-
diction without violating the Fourteenth Amendment."
11 The court refers to the situation where conversion by will is relied upon
to bring the decedent's estate within the state's jurisdiction. In Tc Sanford's
Estate, 188 Iowa 833, 175 N. W. 506 (1919) ; Land Title & Trust Co. v. S. C.
Tax Com., 181 S. C. 192, 126 S. E. 189 (1925). Pennsylvania, after follow-
ing the doctrine for many years, repudiated it in In Te Robinson's Estate,
285 Pa. 308, 132 Atl. 127 (1926), probably because of the Frick case.
12 Murry v. King, 153 Mo. App. 710, 135 S. W. 107 (1911) ; Stoedfleth v.
Britten, 105 N. J. Eq. 3, 146 At. 583 (1929).
13 Semmler v. Beulah Mining Co., 48 N. D. 1011, 188 N. W. 310 (1922);
N. Y. Central & H. R. R. v. Cottle, 102 Misc. 30, 168 N. Y. Supp. 463, zff'd,
187 App. Div. 131, 175 N. Y. Supp. 178 (4th Dep't 1919); ln -e fDenning's
Estate, 112 Ore. 621, 229 Pac. 912 (1924) (purchaser in possession).
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lateral security, until dividends plus the amount realized from security equal
his deposit.' A recent decision 2 denies the right of a surety who has paid
part of a secured deposit to participate by virtue of its contract of indemnity
as a general creditor in the assets of an insolvent bank.3 The court relies
substantially on two arguments advanced by the United States Supreme
Court in a similar case: 4 first, that if the surety's claim were allowed, the
depositor's recovery would be diminished by his proportionate share of the
assets paid to the surety and the value of the surety bond would thus be
lessened pro tanto in violation of the suretyship agreement; and secondly,
that a species of "double proof" would result to the injury of the principal
debtor's other creditors, for under the applicable "chancery rule" the de-
positor would still be entitled to dividends on his entire original claim.
The first of these objections is largely drawn by analogy from the law
of subrogation. It is well established that a surety cannot claim subrogation
against an insolvent debtor until the claim of the creditor has been paid in
full.5 Otherwise, the creditor would not obtain the full protection contem-
plated by the surety bond. Likewise, a surety who holds security of an
insolvent debtor must give the benefit of it to the creditor for whom he is
surety until the debt is fully paid.6 In the principal case, where the amount
of the surety bond plus dividends on the depositor's full claim was inadequate
to prevent him from suffering loss, the court observed that by claiming in-
demnity the surety could achieve the same result as if subrogated to the
rights of the depositor, and the depositor's recovery would be diminished
by his proportionate share of the assets paid to the surety.7 The argument
appears tenuous in that it overlooks the possibility of determining the exact
amount of the depositor's proportionate share of the assets to be paid to the
surety, deducting the same from the surety's claim, and crediting the depogi-
I Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360
(1899); Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong, 59 Fed. 372 (C. C. A. 0th,
1893). For the contrary "bankruptcy rule" see First American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Town of Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900 (1928). In the
application of the "Chancery rule" the courts have drawn no distinction
between the rights of a depositor holding a pledge of collateral, a mortgage
of property or a contract of suretyship. See United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank, 17 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927);
American Surety Co. of New York v. De Carle, 25 F. (2d) 18 (C. C. A.
9th, 1928).
2Blair v. Board of Education of Prairie Township, 176 N. E. 99 (Ohio
1930).
3 For decisions contra to the principal case see United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank, supra note 1; United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. McClintock, 26 F. (2d) 944 (D. C. Wyo. 1927); National
Surety Co. v. Jenkins, 18 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). All were sub.
sequently overruled by the United States Supreme Court in National Surety
Co. v. Jenkins, 277 U. S. 258, 48 Sup. Ct. 445 (1928). In the interim the
same result as that of the principal case was reached in American Surety
Co. of New York v. DeCarle, supra note 1.
4 National Surety Co. v. Jenkins, supra note 3.
5 United States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S. 73, 41 Sup. Ct. 29 (1920);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fouts, 11 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); lKnaffl
v. Knoxville Banking and Trust Co., 133 Tenn. 655, 182 S. W. 232 (1915);
SHELDON, SUBROGATiION (2nd ed., 1893) § 127.
1 01 BRANDT, SURETYSHIP (3rd ed. 1905) § 357; SHELDON, Op. Cit. Mipra
note 5, §§ 154, 155.
7 Blair v. Board of Education, supra note 2, at 100.
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tor therefor. The more substantial objection that, as a result of the operation
of the "chancery rule," allowance of the surety's claim would increase the
liabilities of the bank beyond those existing when it was declared banlupt
persists even when the amount of the surety bond plus dividends on the de-
positor's full claim is more than adequate to preserve the depositor from
loss.8 Since public policy is squarely opposed to the existence of bank liabil-
ities not reflected in the bank statement, it is predicted that the principal case
will be uniformly followed.9
MEASURE or DAIAGES IN CASES Or WUnuL FAILURE TO COMPLETE
PERFORMANCE
IN Glazer v. Schwartz' the Massachusetts Supreme Court announces a
rule of damages which stands without support in law or reason and in clear
conflict with the propositions adopted by the American Law Institute.2 In
a suit by a contractor to enforce a mechanic's lien for the balance due upon
a construction contract, the owner defended and counter-claimed on the
ground that the plaintiff had intentionally failed to comply with the specifi-
cations of the contract. Of the contract price of $14,700, $13,000 had been
paid. In denying recovery either on the contract or on a quantum nezrdt,
the court followed the generally settled rule that a wilful breach is a bar to
a suit for restitution for benefits conferred on the innocent party.3 In addi-
tion, however, it held, on grounds of the plaintiff's intentional breach, that
the owner was entitled to recover on his counterclaim the reasonable cost of
completing the construction in conformance to specifications without deduct-
ing the unpaid balance of the contract price.
s Fouts v. Maryland Casualty Co., 30 F. (2d) 357 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
The surety was allowed subrogation to the rights of the depositor after the
depositor's claim had been fully satisfied. Quacr, if the court had allowed
the surety to recover on its contract of indemnity, could the surety also have
benefited by the "chancery rule" by claiming for the full amount of the surety
bond, or would it be required to deduct excess dividends already received
through subrogation to the depositor's rights?
9 The same problem as presented in the principal case has arisen under
the Federal Bankruptcy Act, for the "bankruptcy rule" that a dividend shall
be paid only on the unpaid balance after the conversion of the security (30
STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 93 (h) (1926)) does not apply where the
creditor holds a contract of suretyship as security for his claim. 30 STT.
545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § I subd. 23 (1926). See United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Carnegie Trust Co., 177 App. Div. 176, 164 N. Y. Supp. 92
(1st Dep't 1917) where the surety was allowed to share by virtue of its con-
tract of indemnity in the bankrupt's assets.
176 N. E. 613 (Mass. 1931).
See CONTRACTs RESTATEMNT (Am. L. Inst. 1930) §§ 326 and 337.
2 Bowen v. Kimbell, 203 Mass. 364, 89 N. E. 542 (1909); Smedley v.
Walden, 246 Mass. 393, 141 N. E. 281 (1923); Kelley v. Hance, 103 Conn.
186, 142 Atl. 683 (1928), noted in (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. REv. 211, (1929)
88 YALE L. J. 389; WooDwAnn, QuASI-CoNTACTS (1913) §§ 16G-175; see
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 739, 761,
n. 64. Contra: Britton v. Turner, 6 N. H. 481 (1834) (contract of service) ;




It is recognized that in a suit for damages for breach of contract, the
motives and circumstances attending the breach are immaterial, 4 the pur-
pose of damages being merely to place the injured party in the same position
as if the contract had not been broken.6 Accordingly, where the owner
brings action against a contractor for a wilful abandonment of the contract,
he cannot recover the cost of completion without deducting the unpaid
portion of the contract price.O Conversely, where performance by the con-
tractor is prevented by an unwarranted repudiation by the owner, the
former must deduct from the contract price the cost of completion saved.'
In the light of these principles, it is difficult to understand the instant
court's allowance of a full recovery for the cost of completion without
deduction. The owner achieves a better position than if the contract had
been faithfully performed. If the excessive award is regarded as punitive
damages, the court ignored a settled rule that punitive damages are not
recoverable for breach of contract. 8
DISCLOSURE OF TRADE SECRETS IN LITIGATION
IN Coca-Cola Co. v. Wirthman Drug Co.,' the complaint alleged that the
defendant, a dispenser of the plaintiff's syrup, had diluted the product. As
proof, it offered the affidavits of chemists to the effect that the specific
gravity and chemical content of the defendant's syrup was less than that
of coca-cola, and that "therefore the defendant's syrup had been diluted
with water." The plaintiff declined to put in evidence the specific gravity
and chemical content of coca-cola because to do so would disclose a valuable
trade secret. The affidavits were excluded, and a decree dismissing the bill
was affirmed.
The difficulty in such a situation arises largely from a clash of the two
principles that a trade secret is legitimate prey for all who may come by
it honestly 2 and that a litigant is entitled to information regarding essen-
tial facts within the knowledge of his opponent.8 It is generally held that a
4 Duche v. Wilson, 37 Hun 519 (N. Y. 1885); Kelley, Maus & Co. v. La
Crosse Carriage Co., 120 Wis. 84, 97 N. W. 674 (1903) ; see Magnolia Metal
Co. v. Gale, 189 Mass. 124, 133, 75 N. E. 219, 220 (1005); Westfall v.
Mapes, 3 Grant 198, 199 (Pa. 1855) ; 2 SEDGWiCK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912)
§ 602.
5 2 SEDGWiCK, loc. cit. supra note 4; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 320; geo
Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 49 F. (2d) 769, 772 (E. D.
Pa. 1931).
e Hirt v. Hahn, 61 Mo. 496 (1876); Hanson Oil & Gas Co. v. Hlower-
ton, 111 Kan. 304, 206 Pac. 909 (1922); Juell v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 223 App. Div. 612, 229 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1st Dep't 1928) (action on
bond against surety); CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 326, 337(1).
7 Gaffey v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 202 Mass. 48, 88 N. E. 330 (1909);
Buchholz v. Green Bros. Co., 172 N. E. 101 (Mass. 1930); Hottinger v.
Hoffman-Henon Co., 303 Pa. 283, 154 At]. 598 (1931) ; CONTRACTS RESTATE-
MENT § 337(2).
8 2 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES § 603; CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT § 333.
1 48 Fed. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
2 HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 1917) 253.




plaintiff is not obliged to set out the details of his trade secret in the
pleadings. 4 Nor will a bill of particulars be granted to a defendant who
already had knowledge of the secret, as in a suit to enjoin disclosure.'
At the trial, however, the plaintiff is required to make a sufficient disclosure
not only to sustain the burden of proof 6 but also to permit the defendant
adequately to defend himselfL The plaintiff must also reveal the secret
ingredients of his product, if its cost as a basis for damages is challenged
by the defendants But where the defendant as a defense to a suit for unfair
competition, charged that the plaintiff's product was deleterious to the
health, it was held that the plaintiff in answer had no duty to disclose its
ingredients.9 Whether in the converse situation an alleged patent infringer
may be compelled to reveal his trade secrets depends largely on the exi-
gencies of the case and the plaintiff's motive in seeking a disclosure.10 An
order permitting an inspection of the defendant's factory for evidence of
infringement will be allowed if the plaintiff has established a prima fade
case; ' 1 but not if there is nothing but a "mere suspicion" of infringement,':
or if his intention is clearly to pry into the defendant's affairs13 At trial,
if the defendant's secrets are necessary to the completeness of the plaintiff's
case, disclosure must be made.' 4 But it is otherwise where such evidence
4 S. Jarvis Adams Co. v. Knapp, 121 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 6th, 1903). Nor
need it be set out in the decree. Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq.
293, 78 At. 698 (1910).
5 Paper Textile Mach. Co. v. Newlin, 101 N. J. Eq. 115, 137 AUt. 314
(1927).
6 Herold v. Herold China Pottery Co., 257 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919);
Taylor IrQn & Steel Co. v. Nichols, 73 N. J. Eq. 684, 69 AtI. 186 (1908). In
Baglin v. Cusenier, 164 Fed. 25, 28 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908) it was said: "It is
unfortunate for the complainants that their liqueur is made under a secret
formula, which, naturally enough, they decline to disclose; but.., a charge
that defendant is perpetrating a fraud must be established by something
more than mere opinions and conjectures, and especially is this true, where
the party upon whom the burden rests has it in his power to establish
fraud, if it exists, by proof which it will be practically impossible to
contradict."
7Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 60, 188 N. Y.
Supp. 678 (1st Dep't, 1921).
s Burnett v. Phalon, 11 Abb. Pr. 157, 19 How. Pr. 530 (N. Y. 1860).
9 Tetlow v. Savournin, 15 Phila. 170, 38 L. I. 478 (Pa. 1881).
"0 Defendant compelled to testify: Coop v. Dr. Savage Physical Develop-
ment Institute, 48 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1891) (defendant's general denial
as mere conclusion); In re Grove, 180 Fed. 62 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910) (con-
tempt proceedings); Rowell v. William Koehl Co., 194 Fed. 446 (W. D. N. Y.
1912) (non-disclosure raises presumption of infringement). Defendant
not compelled to testify: Dobson v. Graham, 49 Fed. 17 (E. D. Pa. 1889)
(no evidence of infringement); Herreshoff v. Knietsch, 127 Fed. 492 (S. 1Y.
N. Y. 1904) (cross-examination).
"1 Diamond Match Co. v. Oshkosh Match Works, 63 Fed. 984 (E. D. Wis.
1894).
I2Eibel Process Co. v. Remington-Martin Co., 197 Fed. 760 (N. D. N. Y.
1912).
'3 Stokes Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Heller, 56 Fed. 297 (D. N. J. 1893).
- Roberts v. Walley, 14 Fed. 167 (N. D. N. Y. 1892).
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is irrelevant, 5 or would add nothing to the strength of the lilaintiff's case. o
As a practical measure the courts frequently permit the parties to pro-
ceed in camera, wherein all but the litigants and essential witnesses are
excluded from the taking of evidence."7 But while this method proves
workable enough in suits to enjoin the disclosure of trade secrets whore
both parties are acquainted with them, it is of questionable value in cases
where one party is compelled to put the secret in evidence, and the other,
usually a business rival, is presumably ignorant of it.18
It is clear from these decisions that trade secrets will be protected in the
course of litigation only to the extent that the rights of the litigants are
not prejudiced by such protection.19 In the principal case the court was
fully warranted in refusing to permit the plaintiff to support his claim by
a mere assertion of the vital issue which would leave the defendant with
no adequate means of defense.
TENANT'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION Fon FIXTURES ANNEXED TO
CONDEMNED LAND
IN proportioning a condemnation award between lessor and lessee, the usual
procedure is to ascertain the value of the property as a whole, determine
the value of the leasehold interest, allot that sum to the tenant, and then
grant the remainder to the landlord.' But in order to secure to the latter the
entire amount of the award for valuable city property it is a common
practice to insert in the lease a condemnation clause to the effect that It
shall terminate upon a taking by eminent domain.m2 Although the tenant's
right to compensation for the leasehold interest is thereby destroyed, the
SNew York Court of Appeals, by a divided court, has recently decided that
the lessee's right to an award for his fixtures is not affected. 4
The New York Courts have uniformly held that while trade fixtures are
personal property between the landlord and the tenant, at least so far as
the right of removal at the expiration of his term is concerned, between
the tenant and a condemning party they are real property and subject to
condemnation. 5 The dissenting judges supported the contention that the
15 Crocker-Wheeler Co. v. Bullock, 134 Fed. 241 (S. D. Ohio 1904).
16 Turrell v. Spaeth, 2 Ban & Ard. 185, 8 0. G. 986 (D. N. J. 1875).
", For a discussion of this procedure see Stone v. Graselli Chemical Co.,
65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 Atl. 736 (1903).
18In the peculiar case of Deming v. Chapman, 11 How. Pr. 382 (N. Y.
1854), it was held that an injunction was not the proper remedy to prevent
disclosure of a trade secret, because the information was no longer vecret
when revealed to the court (revelation being obviously necessary to prove
plaintiff's case).
19 On the general subject of trade secrets, see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d
ed. 1923) § 2212; HOPKINS, op. cit. supra, note 2, §§ 108-111.
'Matter of City of New York (Delancey St.), 120 App. Div. 700, 105
N. Y. Supp. 779 (1st Dep't, 1907); 2 LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3rd ed.
1909) § 719.
2 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (2nd ed. 1917) § 233.
3eIn r Mayor of City of New York, 168 N. Y. 254, 61 N. E. 249 (1901);
of. Matter of New York (Pier Old No. 11), 124 App. Div. 465, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 2 (1st Dep't, 1908), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 539, 84 N. E. 1123 (1908).
4In re Allen St. and First Ave., 256 N. Y. 236, 176 N. E. 377 (1931).
5 In re Appointment of Park Commissioners, 1 N. Y. Supp. 763 (Buffalo
Super. Ct. 1888); Matter of City of New York (North River Waterfront),
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fixtures remained chattels during the period of annexation by citing cases
in which condemnation 'was not involved, thus apparently ignoring the
recognized view that fixtures vary in classification according to the relations
of the parties involved.6 The chief contention of the city appellant, how-
ever, was not that fixtures should be considered personalty in condemnation
proceedings, but rather that, since the condemnation clause destroyed the
leasehold interest, the award was contrary to the rule that a tenant is not
entitled to compensation for his fixtures pcr se but only insofar as they
enhance the value of his leasehold interest.7 The court denied the validity
of this theory of compensation, and held the correct basis of award to be
the enhancemeTLt of the value of the real property as a whole by reason
of the annexation of the fixtures owned by the tenant.
Clearly it is arguable that since by reason of the clause in the lease the
tenant upon condemnation retained no interest in realty which the city
was taking or to -which the fixtures could be attached, his position should
be no better than if the lease had been terminated by the lapse of the
period specified therein. Furthermore, if at the time of condemnation the
lease has but a short period to run it would appear illogical to compensate
the tenant for the value of his fixtures or even for the cost of their re-
moval. On the other hand it is inconceivable that a tenant, ordinarily
entitled upon condemnation to damages for the loss of both leasehold and
fixtures, should agree with the landlord to waive not only compensation for
the former, which would benefit the landlord, but also compensation for the
latter, which could benefit only the condemnor. It may be doubted, there-
fore, whether a, condemning party, taking the real property as a whole
without regard to the division of interests involved s should be permitted
to take advantage of such an agreement and be relieved of the obligation
to compensate for fixtures through the application of a technical rale of
valuation. Moreover in its decision the court in the instant case is not
without precedent. Where a lease provided that the lessor should be entitled
to any award if the premises were taken by public authorities, and that
the lessee had the right to remove the buildings at the end of the term,
it was held, in a contest between landlord and tenant, that if upon a new
trial title to the buildings were found to be in the lessee, he would be
entitled to an award for the buildings paid by the city condemnor to the
lessor, having only waived the right to claims based on the curtailment of
his term.9 In view of the effect of the lease provisions in these cases,
118 App. Div. 865, 103 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1st Dep't, 1907), aff'd, 189 N. Y.
508, 81 N. E. 1162 (1907); Matter of Willcox, 165 App. Div. 197, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 141 (2d Dep't, 1914); Matter of City of New York (Rockaway Blvd.),
201 App. Div. 862, 193 N. Y. Supp. 951 (2d Dep't, 1922); 1 NiCHoLs, Eui-
NENT DomAIN § 234. See also Matter of City of New York (North River
Waterfront), 192 N. Y. 295, 300, 301, 84 N. E. 1105, 1107 (1908) ; Matter
of City of New York (Block Avenue A), 66 Misc. 488, 512, 122 N. Y. Supp,
321, 339 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
SSee Tym, FIXuUns (1877) 147.
7 Cf. Matter of City of New York (North River Waterfront), 118 App.
Div. 865, 103 N. Y. Supp. 908 (1st Dep't, 1907); ]Matter of New York (De-
lancey St.), supra note 1; 1 NICHOLS, EMINENT De0AIN (2d ed. 1917) § 234.
8 See In Te Appointment of Park Commissioners, supra note 5 at 768; 2
Luwis, EMINENT DomA.n § 716.
9 Poidlon v. Gerry, 179 N. Y. 14, 71 N. E. 262 (1904). And see Matter of
City of New York (Waterfront on North River), 193 N. Y. 117, 85 X. Ej
1064 (1908), where it was held that an agreement between lessor and lessee,
subsequent to the institution of condemnation proceedings whereby the lessee
1931]
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namely, to compensate the lessor for what is actually the tenant's loss, and
in view of the strong possibility of unequal bargaining power, it is a
justifiable query whether they should not be considered invalid as opposed
to public policy.
FINALITY OF AWARDS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
FRo M the inception of Workmen's Compensation Acts, it became apparent
that their successful administration was quite incompatible with a close
adherence to the doctrine of res judicata. "To assure plenary justice to
injured employees the compensation statutes very generally provide for the
modification of awards by industrial commissions., Most of these provisions
enumerate specific grounds for the review of awards to increase, diminish,
or terminate compensation,2 and, if strictly construed, often result in grave
injustice to deserving claimants.3 A few states, however, have permitted
the commission wide discretionary powers by means of an unqualified grant
of continuing jurisdiction over its award.4 At least one court has expressly
denied the application of the doctrine of res judicata to claims decided
under such an act.5
In Roxana Petroleum Corporation v. Hornberger, 3 a divided Oklahoma
court reversed an award of additional compensation and denied the juris.
diction of the commission to rehear a cause after the statutory period for
appeal had expired upon the ground that there was no change in condition
warranting the reopening of a final award. The majority argued that
the clause giving the commission continuing jurisdiction to make "such
changes with respect to its former orders as in its opinion may be justified"
was limited by the clause providing that the decision of the commission
should be final unless appealed within thirty days.1 Such an interpretation
of the governing provisions of the Act seems to be out of harmony with
surrendered to the lessor all rights under the lease and all claims against
the city condemnor for destruction of the leasehold interest, does not destroy
the right reserved by the tenant to damages from the city for the impair-
ment in value of his structures and fixtures.
1 JONES, DIGEST OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (11th ed. 1929) § 26,
2 Of the forty-four state Workmen's Compensation Acts, all except Now
Hampshire have some form of modification provision.
80f. Mullen v. Dep't of Labor and Indistries, 157 Wash. 329, 288 Pac.
926 (1930). (further award denied although total disability unexpectedly
continued and claimant was unable to obtain work).
4 See OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) § 7325, as amended by LAWS (1923) c. 61,
§ 13; UTAH ComP. LAWS (1917) § 3144; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page 1926) § 1465-
86; N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 66;§ 123 (permits exercise of continu.
ing jurisdiction if, in commission's opinion, it is justified); CAL. GUN. LAWS
(Deering, 1923) Act 4749, § 20 (d) (alteration of awards within 245 weeks
after upon the appearance of good cause); COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930)
§ 8190 (on ground of error, mistake, or change); MONT. REV. CODE (Choate,
1921) § 2952, as amended by LAWS (1929) c. 177, p. 364; W. VA. OFF. CoDn
(1931) c. 23, art. 4, § 16.
5 Bartlett Hayward Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 203 Cal, 522,
265 Pac. 195 (1928). But of. United Dredging Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission, 208 Cal. 705, 284 Pac. 922 (1930).
61 Pac. (2d) 393 (Okla. 1931).
7 OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) §§ 7296, 7297, 7325, as amended by LAWS
(1923) c. 61, §§ 8, 13.
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the accepted principle that wbrkmen's compensation legislation be liberally
construed.8 The New York courts, operating under a similar actO have
upheld the authority of the commission to reopen a claim and modify the
award, notwithstanding that the claimant had suffered no change of dis-
ability,o even in the case of a lump-sum award made final by failure to
appeal. n It has been urged that, since these Acts are in derogation of the
common law, the powers of the commission are limited to those which the
statutes confer expressly, or by necessary implication.' 2 But, in keeping
with their avowed humanitarian principle, the more liberal interpretation
seems to authorize the commission's exercise of discretion in granting re-
hearings and further compensation, and to warrant intervention by appel-
late courts only when there has been a clear abuse of that power.13 The
Roxana case sacrificed the flexibility of the commission procedure by the
importation of a final judgment rule apparently intended by the legislature
to apply only to the method of appeal.'4
8 Sole v. Kindelberger, 91 W. Va. 603, 114 S. E. 151 (1922) ; 1 HoNNom,
WOuuN'S COMPENSATION (1918) § 6.
9 See N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 66, §§ 22, 23; OxLA. ComiP. STAT.
(1921) §§ 7296, 7297, as amended by the SESSIoNS LAWS (1923) c. 61, § 8.
See statutes cited supra note 4.
,0 Polucci v. Norris Co., 195 App. Div. 805, 187 N. Y. Supp. 52 (3d Dep't,
1921).
3"1Metcalf v. Firth Carpet Co. 196 App. Div. 790, 188 N. Y. Supp.
448 (3d Dep't, 1921).
12 Bosquet v. Howe Scale Co., 96 Vt. 364, 120 Atl. 171 (1923) ; Schmitt v.
American Brass Co., 109 Conn. 599, 145 Atl. 164 (1929). But ef. M[cCulloch
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 107 Conn. 164, 140 Atl. 114 (1927) (the court
held it a denial of justice to refuse to rehear a case when it was shown
that the claimant had previously been financially unable to furnish a copy
of testimony).
Z3 Gonirenki v. American Steel & Wire Co., 106 Conn. 1, 137 AUt. 26
(1926); see Thrash v. Graver Corp., 131 Old. 260, 261, 262, 268 Pac. 718,
720 (1928).
14 Unlike Oklahoma, Illinois, Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have definite statutory
time limitations upon the power of the commission to reopen an award.
Supra note 1. Montana imposes a two year limitation upon any revision of
a final settlement or award. The California commission can act only within
245 weeks after the award has been made. See statutes cited sipra note 4.
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